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Concern for the environment and decline of open space in the
United States have led to a number of innovative land use devices in
recent decades.' One such device is the conservation easement. 2 En-
forceable by nonprofit or governmental agencies, conservation easements
restrict the use of real estate for the purpose of retaining or protecting the
natural, agricultural, scenic, or open-space value of the property.3 Be-
* A.B., University of California, Berkeley 1983; Member, Second Year Class.
1. See generally A. DUNHAM, PRESERVATION OF OPEN SPACE AREAS: A STUDY OF
THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ROLE (1966) (monograph detailing the adoption of private land
rights for use by organizations interested in the cause of open space); M. LEVIN, J. ROSE & J.
SLAVET, NEW APPROACHES TO STATE LAND-USE POLICIES (1974) (study of existing New
Jersey land use policies and analyses of innovative land use policies in other states); LAND
SAVING ACTION: A WRITTEN SYMPOSIUM BY 29 EXPERTS ON PRIVATE LAND CONSERVA-
TION IN THE 1980s (R. Brenneman & S. Bates ed. 1984) (written symposium on conservation
issues and land preservation managment); PRIVATE OPTIONS: TOOLS AND CONCEPTS FOR
LAND CONSERVATION (Montana Land Reliance & Land Trust Exchange ed. 1982) (collec-
tion of articles discussing private conservation techniques).
2. The term "conservation easement" is used throughout this Note, although some stat-
utes and scholars refer to such easements as conservation servitudes, conservation futures, less-
than-fee interests, scenic easements and interests, or development rights. See, e.g., Korngold,
Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Context of in Gross Real Cove-
nants and Easements, 63 TEx. L. REV. 433, 437 (1984). Korngold suggests the term "conser-
vation servitude" as "a neutral term that avoids the traditional categories." As is argued,
however, in § I(B)(2)(a) infra, the term "easement" is chosen by legislatures precisely because
it is not neutral. This Note uses the term "easement" because it is the prevalent term and is
used in the Unifo-m Conservation Easement Act and the California Civil Code, the primary
statutory references of this Note. See infra note 3.
3. Definitions of conservation easements vary widely among statutes and commentators.
They differ primarily in the scope of real property covered. The definition stated here is
broader than that contained in some (usually earlier) statutes since it includes agricultural and
open-space areas, and paraphrases the Uniform Conservation Easement Act. The Act defines
a conservation easement as
a nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing limitations or affirma-
tive obligations the purposes of which include retaining or protecting natural, scenic,
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cause of increasing concern for the environment and beneficial tax laws, 4
the use of conservation easements has grown dramatically in the last
twenty years. 5
Whether this growth will continue may depend upon the effect of
changes in the area surrounding the land with the easement. At common
law, the equitable doctrine of changed conditions allowed a court to ter-
minate a real covenant 6 or equitable servitude 7 when changed conditions
in or around the burdened land frustrated the purpose of the restriction
or created an undue hardship on the owner of the burdened land. Courts
found that the implied intent of the parties was to lift the restriction in
the event such a change in circumstances occurred.
Currently, there is substantial debate about the applicability of the
doctrine of changed conditions to conservation easements. Some have ar-
gued that courts should apply the doctrine to conservation easements just
as they apply it to the common law servitudes." Yet, the conservation
easement's public and environmental purposes appear to preclude termi-
or open-space values of real property, assuring its availability for agricultural, forest,
recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhanc-
ing air or water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or
cultural aspects of real property.
UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(1), 12 U.L.A. 64 (Supp. 1989). As of August 16,
1988, the following 14 states and the District of Columbia have adopted the Uniform Conser-
vation Easement Act: Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin. California defines a
conservation easement to mean
any limitation in a deed, will, or other instrument in the form of an easement, restric-
tion, covenant, or condition, which is or has been executed by or on behalf of the
owner of the land subject to such easement and is binding upon successive owners of
such land, and the purpose of which is to retain land predominantly in its natural,
scenic, historical, agricultural, forested, or open-space condition.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.1 (West 1982).
4. See infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
5. In 1975, 16 states had enabling statutes for conservation easements. By 1984, 44
states had enabling statutes. 3 R. POWELL, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 430.2[2] (1987). One
author has expressed concern that the growth of conservation easements occurred too quickly.
"Because their problems are easy to overlook, conservation easements are rapidly becoming
the most misused and overused tool for land protection in the United States." Roush, What's
Wrong with Easements? in PRIVATE OPTIONS: TOOLS AND CONCEPTS FOR LAND CONSERVA-
TION, supra note 1, at 71. The "problems," according to the author, are that conservation
easements can be unreliable, difficult to draft, and expensive to monitor. The possibility of
losing current tax deduction status and the uncertainty of easement appraisals are additional
problems. Id. at 71-72.
6. A real covenant is a promise respecting the use of land, which, when certain formali-
ties are satisfied, will bind not only the parties to the original contract but successors to their
real property rights. A. CASNER, 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.1 (1952)
7. An equitable servitude is similar to a real covenant. Although it does not meet the
formal requirements of a covenant, it will be enforced against successive owners who have
knowledge of the original agreement. Id. § 9.24.
8. See, e.g., Korngold, supra note 2, at 485.
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nation based on a judicially implied intent of the parties to limit their
duration. In addition, conservation easements, unlike common law servi-
tudes, exist now by virtue of state enabling statutes,9 are conveyed by a
recorded deed, are granted in perpetuity,10 and generally do not provide
any method for termination.II The drafters of the Uniform Conservation
Easement Act ("Uniform Act") have termed the issue "problematic" and
left "intact the existing case and statute law of adopting states" as to the
doctrine's applicability.
12
This debate has real world implications. Environmentalists have ex-
pressed concern that development-minded landowners will "attempt to
use the lever of 'changed conditions' to roll away the conservation ease-
ment."13 This Note examines the applicability of the doctrine of changed
conditions to conservation easements. 14 Section I explains the character-
istics and purposes of conservation easements. It argues that conserva-
9. The use of easement law to restrict land for conservation purposes was available
before the enactment of enabling statutes but was considered highly risky. A. DUNHAM, supra
note 1, at 19-22.
10. To qualify as a charitable deduction the Internal Revenue Code requires that a con-
servation easement must be granted in perpetuity. I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1989).
11. Prior to passage, the California Conservation Easement Act, currently codified as
Cal. Civ. Code §§ 815-16 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988), provided for extinguishment, but to
strengthen the requirement of perpetuity, all references to termination were dropped. T. BAR-
RETF & P. LIVERMORE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 32 (1983).
12. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 3 comment, 12 U.L.A. 68 (Supp. 1989).
13. T. BARRETT & P. LIVERMORE, supra note 11, at 33-34.
Despite the likelihood of litigation, there is little scholarly comment regarding this con-
cern. Professor Ginsberg, has stated that "[tjhere is some question whether the doctrine of
changed conditions is applicable to conservation easements or, if it is, whether it should be." 3
R. POWELL, supra note 5, at § 430.7[6]. He then argues for its inapplicability, relying largely
on public policy reasons. Another author, in an article raising policy concerns about the
growth of conservation easements, asks: "does the changed conditions rule ever apply to con-
servation servitudes? The answer is that it does, which has troubled some proponents of con-
servation servitudes, who have sought to avoid the rule's effect." Korngold, supra note 2, at
485 (citations omitted). While Korngold apparently believes the doctrine is applicable in some
cases, he contends that his own policy arguments against privately held conservation ease-
ments would not be adequate to allow a court to terminate such an easement on changed
conditions or hardship grounds. Id. at 485-89. Other commentators have observed that "a
court might apply the doctrine of changed conditions to terminate an otherwise viable [conser-
vation] easement that has become, to some degree, an economic hardship to the owner of
restricted land. Whether a court should be permitted to do so is an important policy question
still to be faced." T. BARRETT & P. LIVERMORE, supra note 11, at 33.
14. Conservation easements, of course, are not invulnerable. They can, unless prohibited
by statute, be terminated by eminent domain (3 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 430.7[2]); foreclo-
sure of the burdened property (Kratovil, Tax Titles: Extinguishment of Easements, Building
Restrictions, and Covenants, 19 Hous. L. REV. 55, 55 (1981)); be declared unenforceable by
marketable title acts, release, abandonment of the easement (Emory, Conservation Easements:
Two Problems Needing Attention, in PRIVATE OPTIONS: TOOLS AND CONCEPTS FOR LAND
CONSERVATION, supra note 1, at 196-97); and merger of the holder of the easement and the
burdened land (3 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 430.7[5]). See also UNIF. CONSERVATION
EASEMENT ACT § 2, 12 U.L.A. 65 (Supp. 1989); 3 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 430.7.
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tion easements are distinct from traditional land use restrictions because
of their unique statutory nature and supporting policy concerns. Section
II provides an overview of the nature, history, policies, and traditional
considerations of the doctrine of changed conditions. Section III ana-
lyzes the application of the doctrine to conservation easements. This
Note concludes that the doctrine should not apply as long as the ease-
ment serves its stated purpose. The policies and considerations support-
ing the changed conditions doctrine in traditional servitude cases are not
present. When the purpose of the easement can no longer be fulfilled,
however, the easement should be terminated. In such a situation, two
options should be available to the courts. First, a court could apply the
cy pres doctrine to reform the easement grant in accordance with the
general intent of the original grant. Second, the fee owner could be re-
quired to pay the easement holder the fair market value of the easement.
I. Conservation Easements
Conservation easements do not fit easily into any previously existing
category of property interests and, thus, application of rules that were
designed to apply to traditional types of property interests can be prob-
lematic. To understand the extent to which the doctrine of changed con-
ditions should govern conservation easements, we should first understand
the history, nature, and purposes of this unique interest.
A. Growth of Conservation Easements
Although conservation easements first appeared in the late 1800s,
they were not used extensively until after the 1930s.15 Early conserva-
tion easements were primarily highway or scenic easements purchased by
the federal government or state governments1 6 for the purpose of pre-
serving the natural scenic view. The lack of a solid statutory basis for
these easements made the nature of the property interest granted unclear
and created enforcement problems.1 7 A 1961 congressional study re-
ported that "on the basis of 20 years of experience, such easements breed
misunderstandings, administrative difficulties, are difficult to enforce,
and cost only a little less than the fee."18
Gradually, state legislatures enacted statutes designed to remedy
these problems. In 1959, California passed the first open space easement
legislation in the United States.19 The California Scenic Easement Deed
Act of 1959 authorized local governments to acquire fee or lesser inter-
15. 3 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 430.2.
16. Id. § 430.2[1].
17. Id.
18. H.R. REP. No. 273, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), (cited in Eveleth, An Appraisal of
Techniques to Preserve Open Space, 9 VILL. L. REV. 560, 567 n.4 (1967)).
19. T. BARRETT & P. LIVERMORE, supra note 11, at 34.
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ests in real property for the purpose of conserving open space. 20 As
before, only public agencies could own the scenic easements. Unfortu-
nately, the California Legislature provided neither guidelines for using
the statute, nor incentives for granting the easements. As a result, the
statute virtually went unused.
21
During the 1960s, Congress and the Internal Revenue Service pro-
vided great impetus for the growth of conservation easements. The Fed-
eral Highway Beautification Act of 196522 granted federal funds to the
states for landscaping and scenic enhancement. At least twenty-nine
states responded by enacting new or additional scenic highway
legislation.23
In 1964 the Internal Revenue Service ruled that taxpayers could de-
duct the value of easements donated to qualified charitable organiza-
tions.24 Subsequent statutory affirmation of that decision 25 further
encouraged states to pass enabling statutes. 26 To qualify for the federal
tax deduction, the Internal Revenue Code requires the donation must be
a grant in perpetuity. 27 This means that "at the time a gift is made, the
possibility that it might be negated by some future event appears 'so re-
mote as to be negligible.' "28 Thus, if the possibility of judicial termina-
tion of a conservation easement based on changed conditions is not so
remote as to be negligible, then the gift of the easement will not be tax
20. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6950-54 (West 1980).
21. T. BARRETr & P. LIVERMORE, supra note 11, at 34.
22. 23 U.S.C.A. §§ 131, 135, 136, 319 (West 1966 & Supp. 1988).
23. See 3 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 430.2[1] and statutes cited therein.
24. Rev. Rul. 64-205, 1964-2 C.B. 62. Qualified charitable organizations include
churches, educational organizations, hospitals and medical research organizations, govern-
ment agencies that receive a substantial part of their support from federal or state government
or from public contributions for the purpose of benefitting an educational organization, and
trusts and foundations supported by contributions from the general public. I.R.C. § 170(h)(3)
(West Supp. 1989).
25. In 1965, I.R.S. News Release No. 784 (Nov. 15, 1965) was issued, confirming the
availability of tax deductions for scenic easements. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 codified the
deduction at I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) (West Supp. 1989). The availability of deductions re-
mained uncertain, however, until the 1980 amendments to I.R.C. § 170 that allow deductions
for donations of "a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the
real property," to a qualified charitable organization. I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (West Supp.
1989). (See supra note 24 for a definition of a "qualified charitable organization"). For discus-
sion of the tax benefits of conservation easements, see T. BARRETr & P. LIVERMORE, supra
note 11, at 45-80; 3 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 430.4; Note, Tax Incentives for Land: The
Charitable Contribution Deduction for Gifts of Conservation Easements, 11 B. C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 105 (1983) (authored by Janet L. Madden); Comment, New York's Conservation Ease-
ment Statute: The Property Interest and its Real Property and Federal Income Tax Conse-
quences, 49 ALB. L. REV. 430 (1985) (authored by John C. Partigan).
26. 3 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 430.2[2].
27. I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1989).
28. T. BARRETt & P. LIVERMORE, supra note 11, at 60 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1. 170A-
a(e) (1989)).
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deductible. The likelihood of the success of a changed conditions chal-
lenge, then, has significant tax implications.
State tax benefits on real property also have contributed to the
growth of conservation easements. Land with a conservation easement
generally is less valuable on the open market than land without the re-
striction, and therefore usually is assessed at a lower value.29 Although
the right to reduced assessments is often statutorily required, 30 courts
generally grant this right even when it is not codified. In Village of
Ridgewood v. Bolger Foundation,3' for example, the court followed the
majority view, stating that
by giving up in perpetuity the right to do anything with the property
other than keep it in its natural state, [the landowner] has, as the
County Tax Board found, seriously compromised its value as a mar-
ketable commodity.... [T]he adverse impact of such an encumbrance
on market value must be taken into account in arriving at an assessed
valuation.
32
Reductions in estate taxes also are available. An heir to a large es-
tate that includes vast tracts of open space, for example, has to pay taxes
on the estate based on the fair market value of the land. "The resulting
tax can be so high that the heirs must sell the property to pay the
taxes."' 33 If the land is restricted by a conservation easement, however,
the property's market value (and therefore assessed value) will be less.
In sum, conservation easements are of relatively recent origin. Their
use for land use regulation has grown significantly with the rise of en-
abling statutes and tax incentives by both state and federal governments.
B. The Nature of the Conservation Easement
Application of the doctrine of changed conditions often depends on
the type of interest that is sought to be terminated. Generally, a positive,
appurtenant easement, such as a right of access across a neighbor's prop-
29. T. BARRETT & P. LIVERMORE, supra note 11, at 64-66 (conservation easement repre-
sents a loss in market value due to the loss of development potential); 3 R. POWELL, supra
note 5, § 430.5[l]. Comment, supra note 25, at 453-56 (a conservation easement, if donated,
will generate a charitable tax deduction but will also trigger an adjustment to the property's
basis that reflects its lowered value).
30. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 815.10 (West Supp. 1988); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§ 402.1 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-109 (1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 15-32-5-2.6-
7 (Burns Supp. 1988); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 247(3) (McKinney 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
16, § 11943 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
31. 104 N.J. 337, 517 A.2d 135 (1986).
32. Id. at 342, 517 A.2d at 138.
33. J. DIEHL & T. BARRETT, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK 9 (1988) In
Jackson Hole, Wyoming, for example, development pressures raising property values of ranch-
land, and consequently estate taxes, made it difficult for ranchers to keep their land in the
family. Now, more than 3200 acres of conservation easements protect these ranchlands and
keep estate taxes low. Id. at 40.
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erty, cannot be terminated by a changed conditions challenge. A nega-
tive covenant, such as a restriction on subdivision lot owners from using
their property for any use other than for residential purposes, is more
likely to be terminated due to changed conditions. For this reason, an
examination of the nature of the conservation easement is necessary.
(1) Types of Conservation Easements
Although the modem conservation easement is a creature of statute,
nonstatutory easements were used for conservation purposes at common
law as well. 34 The characteristics of such easements, however, raised se-
rious doubts about their durability and made their use risky and thus
rare.35 Courts disfavored these easements for they not only impeded land
use but they could be held in gross-that is, unlike other easements, these
were enforceable by persons other than a neighboring landowner.
36
The statutory conservation easement prevalent today arguably is an
entirely new type of property interest that does not fit into the traditional
categories of easement, real covenant, and equitable servitude. 37 Some
commentators have contended that this development is the beginning of
a long-awaited revolution in servitude law.38 The drafters of the Uni-
form Act, however, expressly rejected the proposal of creating a "novel
additional interest ... unknown to the common law" since such a devel-
opment would be merely an "ill-defined... amalgam of the three tradi-
tional common law interests.
' 39
Enabling statutes vary widely in terms of what type of conservation
easements may be obtained and who may own them. Generally, statutes
allow for both positive and negative conservation easements. A positive
conservation easement provides the public with the right to make some
specified use of the property. Fishing easements adjacent to streams are
an example.4° More commonly, conservation easements are negative in
nature. A negative easement restricts the burdened landowner's right to
use the land. For example, a common negative conservation easement
prohibits the owner from developing the land contrary to the specifica-
tions made in the grant. The land is still hers, however, and she may use
34. A. DUNHAM, supra note 1, at 19-22.
35. Id. at 21-22. See also notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
36. An easement in gross is one which does not benefit land owned by the easement
holder. A negative easement requires the owner of the burdened land to perform or refrain
from performing some act. A positive easement, by contrast, allows the easement holder to use
the land in some way. A. CASNER, supra note 6, § 8.9.
37. See, eg., Richter, Conservation Rights in Illinois-Meshing Illinois Property Law with
Federal Tax Deduction Requirements, 71 ILL. BJ. 430 (1983).
38. See, eg., Dunham, Statutory Reformation of Land Obligations, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
1345, 1346 (1982) (citing conservation easements as evidence that the use of statutes is "the
modem trend in reforming property law.").
39. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT Prefatory Note, 12 U.L.A. 64 (Supp. 1989).
40. M. LEVIN, J. ROSE & J. SLAVET, supra note 1, at 40.
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the land in any manner not inconsistent with the requirements of the
easement. Thus, while the landowner might be prohibited from con-
structing condominiums, she might be able to add a room to her house.41
The open-space easement is the least complex type of conservation
easement. The owner of land burdened by an open-space easement has
pledged to restrict development on his property. For example, an open-
space easement might involve a fee owner of agricultural or ranch land in
an area of economic and population growth. 42 Because the land could be
subdivided for development, it is assessed at a value far above its value as
ranch land. The owner, however, does not intend to change its use and
does not wish to sell. He may grant a conservation easement to a quali-
fied nonprofit agency and then receive a charitable tax deduction, have
the property assessed at a lower value, and still use the land as he desires.
While the most common type of conservation easement is the scenic
or open-space easement, historic or facade easements, which prohibit the
owner of an historic building from altering the architectural features of
the exterior of the building, are available in many states.43 Although
early conservation easements could be owned only by the state or federal
government, 44 and often did not include provisions for conserving open
space, the trend is to allow both private nonprofit conservation organiza-
tions and governmental agencies to hold easements, 45 and to expand the
types of easements that can be held.
4 6
(2) Is the Interest an Easement?
Courts traditionally have applied the changed conditions doctrine
only in cases involving real covenants and equitable servitudes. In con-
trast, easements, viewed as distinct property rights and not merely
promises concerning land, traditionally have been resistant to, if not im-
mune from, the doctrine. A determination that a conservation easement
is an easement in fact as well as name, therefore, could preclude, or at
least inhibit, the application of the changed conditions doctrine. An ex-
41. In contrast, a facade or historic easement may restrict not only the use the owner can
make of property, but in addition may require that the owner do some affirmative act such as
maintain the property.
42. For example, productive dairy farmland in Whatcom County, Washington, between
Seattle and Vancouver is protected from development pressures by conservation easements. J.
DIEHL & T. BARRETT, supra note 33, at 26.
43. See Comment, supra note 25.
44. E.g., California Open Space Easement Act of 1974, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51070-97
(West 1980).
45. E.g., California Conservation Easement Act of 1979, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 815-16
(West 1982 & Supp. 1989); UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(2), 12 U.L.A. 64
(Supp. 1989).
46. E.g., California Conservation Easement Act of 1979, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 815-16
(West 1982 & Supp. 1989); UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 61 (Supp.
1989).
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amination of the language used in the Uniform Act and state enabling
statutes, and the essential characteristics of the conservation easement is
required to fully explore this issue.
a. Statutory Language
Because modem conservation easements are created through en-
abling statutes, legislative intent is an important consideration in deter-
mining the applicability of the changed conditions doctrine to
conservation easements. Legislative intent is often revealed by statutory
terminology; thus, the fact that conservation easements are called "ease-
ments" 47 is significant. 48 A legislature is presumed to know the implica-
tions of the terminology used in its statutes.49 If a legislature in a
jurisdiction that does not apply the changed conditions doctrine to ease-
ments names the conservation interest an "easement," a court in that
jurisdiction could conclude that the legislature intended to prevent appli-
cation of the doctrine of changed conditions in a suit to terminate the
easement. Similarly, if a jurisdiction does allow the doctrine's applica-
tion, but gives the holder of an easement greater protection from the doc-
trine than it would the beneficiary of a real covenant or equitable
servitude, a holder of a conservation easement would be given similar
increased protection.
This rationale is apparently one reason the drafters of the Uniform
Act decided to use the term "easement":
The interests protected by the Act are termed "easements." The ter-
minology reflects a rejection of ... suggest[ions] in existing state acts
dealing with non-possessory conservation and preservation interests.
[One such suggestion] removes the common law disabilities associated
with covenants real and equitable servitudes in addition to those asso-
ciated with easements.
50
The drafters did not want to remove all common law disabilities, as this
suggestion urged, but rather, by calling the interest an easement, they
sought to retain only those common law disabilities associated with ease-
ments. According to the Prefatory Note to the Uniform Act the drafters
sought to "sweepfl away certain common law impediments which might
47. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.1 (West 1982); UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT,
12 U.L.A. 61 (Supp. 1989).
48. Professor Korngold warns, however, that "choosing the 'easement' label for a conser-
vation interest and following the classical rules could lead an uncritical decisionmaker to a
quick and rigid result without the necessary policy analysis." Korngold, supra note 2, at 436.
This Note does not suggest that a court should not look beyond the labeling of the interest as
an easement, but merely that the court give the legislature's "labeling" its due weight.
49. See Comment, supra note 25, at 436-40.
50. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT AcT Prefatory Note, 12 U.L.A. 61-62 (Supp.
1989). The drafters also rejected suggested terminology that would "create a novel additional
interest which, although unknown to the common law, is in some ill-defined sense, a statuto-
rily modified amalgam of the three traditional common law interests." Id.
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otherwise undermine the easements' validity, particularly those held in
gross."51 One method used to eliminate such limitations was to term the
interest an easement. Since the doctrine of changed conditions was a
significant method of terminating common law servitudes and covenants,
one can conclude that it was one of the impediments meant to be "swept
away."
Moreover, the Uniform Act provides that "a conservation easement
may be created, conveyed, recorded, assigned, released, modified, termi-
nated, or otherwise altered or affected in the same manner as other ease-
ments." '52 This language further suggests that the drafters intended to
have the individual state's law of easements, rather than the law of cove-
nants or equitable servitudes, govern alterations of the conservation
easement.
The Uniform Act also states that "[e]xcept as provided in Section
3(b), a conservation easement is unlimited in duration unless the instru-
ment creating it otherwise provides."'53 Section 3(b) states that the "Act
does not affect the power of a court to modify or terminate a conserva-
tion easement in accordance with the principles of law and equity."'5 4 At
first glance, the drafters' use of the word "equity" may appear to indicate
an intent to apply equitable servitude law, including the doctrine of
changed conditions to the conservation easement. In the comment to
this section, however, the drafters point out that the changed conditions
doctrine "is applicable to real covenants and equitable servitudes in all
states, but its application to easements is problematic in many states."
They add that enactment of the Uniform Act "leaves intact the existing
case and statute law of adopting states as it relates to the modification
and termination of easements." 55 Reading these provisions and com-
ments together suggests that, while the applicability of the doctrine
clearly is left to the adopting jurisdiction, the applicable law is the juris-
diction's law of easements, not covenants and equitable servitudes.
The California Conservation Easement Act 56 ("California Act") is
not as clear as the Uniform Act regarding whether or not the interest is
an easement. Although terming the interest an "easement," the Califor-
nia Act refers to a conservation easement as an "interest in real prop-
erty."' 57 Traditionally, an easement was an interest in property while a
covenant was merely a promise respecting the use of land. California
51. Id.
52. Id. § 2(a), at 65 (emphasis added).
53. Id. § 2(c), at 65.
54. Id. § 3(b), at 67.
55. Id. § 3 comment, at 68.
56. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 815-16 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988)
57. Id. § 815.2(a) ("A conservation easement is an interest in real property voluntarily
created and freely transferable in whole or in part for the purposes stated in Section 815.1 by
any lawful method for the transfer of interests in real property in this state."); § 815.2(c) ("A
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case law, however, obfuscates this rule, leaving unclear whether the refer-
ence is intended to give the interest the status of an easement.
In Friesen v. Glendale,58 the California Supreme Court followed the
traditional view and held that for purposes of compensation in eminent
domain proceedings, an easement is a compensableproperty right, while a
restriction on development "does not rise to the dignity of an estate in
the land itself," but is essentially only a contractual right.5 9 Under this
view, the use of the term "an interest in property" appears to give conser-
vation easements the status of easements even though they might appear
to be merely contractual restrictions on development. In Southern Cali-
fornia Edison Co. v. Bourgerie,6° however, the same court expressly over-
ruled Friesen6 1 and held that a building restriction, which was
traditionally not a property right, constitutes property for eminent do-
main purposes.62 By broadening the class of rights in property, the
Bourgerie court muddied the rule that an interest in property could refer
to an easement but not a covenant or servitude. Thus, classifying a con-
servation easement an "interest in real property" might have given it the
status of an easement under Friesen, but after Bourgerie this conclusion is
less certain. Because the California Conservation Easement Act was
passed six years after Bourgerie, the term "interest in property" by itself
does not assure that any extra protection given to easements would carry
over to conservation easements. Of course, the interest's title, conserva-
tion easement, still implies easement status.
The California Act also differs from the Uniform Act by containing
no exceptions to the easement's perpetual duration. California's Act pro-
vides that "[a] conservation easement shall be perpetual in duration. '63
This unequivocal statement appears to preclude judicial termination re-
gardless of whether a conservation easement is categorized as an ease-
ment, a covenant, or an equitable servitude. Without this strong
statutory declaration, a court might find that a liublic purpose, such as
promoting the productive use of property, should, override a grant of a
real covenant or equitable servitude, despite a provision for perpetual du-
conservation easement shall not be deemed personal in nature and shall constitute an interest is
real property notwithstanding the fact that it may be negative in character.").
58. 209 Cal. 524, 288 P. 1080 (1930).
59. Id at 531, 288 P. at 1083 (emphasis added).
60. 9 Cal. 3d 169, 507 P.2d 964, 107 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1973).
61. Id. at 175, 507 P.2d at 968, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
62. Id. at 171, 507 P.2d at 965, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
63. CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.2. (West 1982); Cf UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT
§ 2(c), 12 U.L.A. 65 (Supp. 1989), and supra text accompanying notes 53-55. For other stat-
utes permitting perpetual duration, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 31 (West Supp.
1983); MINN. STAT. § 84.64 (1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (1983). For statutes indi-
cating a presumption of unlimited duration, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-103(3) (1982);
GA. CODE ANN. § 44-10-4 (1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-5-2.6-2(c) (1984); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 700.40(2)(c) (West Supp. 1988).
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ration in the grant. The statutory declaration, however, serves as a clear
public demand for the courts to uphold conservation easement grants
regardless of their classification.
b. Nonstatutory Character of Conservation Easements
While conservation easements have a distinctly statutory nature, 6 4
their nonstatutory characteristics also must be examined to determine
whether a court should find the modem conservation easement protected
by easement law. Two authors, writing before the passage of most mod-
ern conservation easement statutes covering open space, stated that "the
type of interest needed to accomplish open-space preservation is so un-
like any easement and so like most restrictive covenants that one can
expect the courts to treat them as covenants. '6 5 As this section will ar-
gue, however, these authors may have underestimated the flexibility of
the easement category and overstated the interest's similarity with
covenants.
The primary difference between the character of the conservation
easement and that of the traditional easement is that the former is both
negative and in gross. At common law, there could be only four types of
negative easements: easements for light, air, support of buildings, and
flow of artificial streams. 66 Unlike a conservation easement, held by a
nonprofit or governmental agency, the benefit of each of the traditional
negative easements is held by a neighboring landowner. The type of re-
striction that is now termed a conservation easement 67 could have been
achieved at common law only by a covenant, which would have been
subject to the doctrine of changed conditions.
One problem with the prediction that courts will treat conservation
easements as covenants is that the boundary between easements and re-
strictive covenants has evolved. Regarding the Restatement of Prop-
erty's definitions of easements, covenants, and servitudes, one scholar has
noted: "Unfortunately, very little substance lies behind these phrases
64. In addition to the discussion of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act, at text
accompanying supra notes 47-54, see, UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT AcT § 4, 12 U.L.A.
68 (Supp. 1989) ("A conservation easement is valid even though: (1) it is not appurtenant to
an interest in real property; ... (3) it is not of a character that has been recognized tradition-
ally at common law.").
65. Kransnowiecki & Paul, The Preservation of Open Space in Metropolitan Areas, 110 U.
PA. L. REV. 179, 194 (1961).
66. J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 962 (1981).
67. One author has suggested that whether a conservation easement is analogous to a
traditional easement or covenant depends on the type of grant in the conservation easement.
For example, prohibiting billboards would be similar to a negative easement, prohibiting sub-
division for commercial development is closer to a traditional real covenant, while prohibiting
excavation or dumping of trash is closer to a restriction. Comment, supra note 25, at 436.
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and using such definitions to distinguish between the forms is virtually
impossible."
'68
A "traditional" easement allows the holder to make some use of the
servient owner's land, while a restrictive covenant restricts the servient
owner's use of his land.69 Under this simplified view, most conservation
easements are indeed similar to covenants. But even traditional ease-
ments did not always match this "traditional" easement definition, as
evidenced by the four common law negative easements. The hesitation to
allow more than four negative easements primarily reflected a fear that a
purchaser of land would not receive notice of such an encumbrance be-
cause no recording system existed.70 With modem recording statutes,
however, the justification for not allowing negative easements has disap-
peared and the types of allowable easements have expanded. In 1928 the
Michigan Supreme Court gave building restrictions easement status, stat-
ing that "the category of easements must expand with the circumstances
of mankind."' 71 Today, the deterioration of the environment requires the
expansion of easement classification through the enactment of conserva-
tion easement statutes.
The Uniform Act acknowledges this expansion by providing that a
"conservation easement is valid even though ... it is not of a character
that has been recognized traditionally at common law."' 72 Thus, the
drafters have made clear that although the character of a conservation
easement may have precluded its recognition in seventeenth century Eng-
land, the interest should be considered an easement by modem courts.
Finally, the characteristics that exclude conservation easements
from the category of "true" easements, also prevent them from being
valid real covenants. Just as easements traditionally could not be held in
gross, neither, in the majority of jurisdictions, could real covenants. 73 In
view of the statutory language giving rise to the interest, and because a
conservation easement does not fit neatly into the traditional covenant
68. Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1181
(1982).
69. Rose, Servitudes, Security, and Assent: Some Comments on Professors French and
Reichman, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1403, 1405 (1982).
70. J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 66, at 962.
71. Johnstone v. Detroit G. H. & M. Ry., 245 Mich. 65, 79, 222 N.W. 325, 330 (1928).
72. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 4(3), 12 U.L.A. 68 (Supp. 1989); see also
id. Prefatory Note ("By eliminating certain outmoded easement impediments which are
largely attributable to the absence of a land title recordation system in England centuries ear-
lier, the Act advances the values implicit in [private ownership of the easements].").
73. A. DUNHAM, supra note 1, at 17; see also Cortese v. United States, 782 F.2d 845 (9th
Cir. 1986) (stating that a covenant is "'an agreement by one party to do or not to do an act;
the act usually concerns the use of his land and affects the land of the party to whom the
promise is made.' ") (quoting 4 H. MILLER & M. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA
REAL ESTATE 25:1 at 154 (1977)) (emphasis added).
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category, a court should have little basis for finding the interest is a
covenant.
In sum, although conservation easements are unlike classical ease-
ments, several factors indicate that courts may treat the interests as ease-
ments. The category of easements has been expanded when courts deem
it necessary to give certain interests greater protection recognizing that
the rationale for limiting the category of easements no longer applies.
Also, the difficulty of fitting conservation easements into the real cove-
nant category should lead a court to rely on the statutory definitions.
Although case law concerning conservation easements is scarce, the few
courts that have directly addressed the nature of conservation easements
have generally treated them as easements, rather than covenants or equi-
table servitudes. 74
C. The Purpose and Policy of Conservation Easements
Because the impossibility of fulfilling the purpose of a restriction on
land is often the basis for a court's use of the changed conditions doctrine
to terminate the restriction, it is important to understand the purposes of
conservation easements. Statutory provisions and case law discussing
these purposes reflect the important policies that support conservation
easements.
(1) Statutory Provisions Regarding the Purpose of Conservation Easements
The purpose of a statutorily authorized conservation easement is
found both in the enabling statutes and in individual easement deeds.
Because the statement of purpose in a deed usually mirrors the language
in the statute, this Note will focus on the general statement of purpose
found in the statutes.
7 5
The Uniform Act provides that the purposes of a valid conservation
easement must "include retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-
space values of real property, assuring its availability for agricultural,
forest, recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural resources,
maintaining or enhancing air or water quality, or preserving the histori-
cal, architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property."'76
Similarly, California's statute requires that the interest "retain land
74. E.g., Village of Ridgewood v. Bolger Found., 104 N.J. 337, 340, 517 A.2d 135, 137
(1986) (holding that for purposes of property tax assessment, "conservation easements of the
kind here considered are easements in gross.").
75. Compare the statement of purpose language in a sample easement ("to assure that the
Property will be retained forever predominantly in its natural, scenic and open space condition
and to prevent any use of the Property that will significantly impair or interfere with the
natural, scenic, open space and ecological values of the Property," T. BARRETT & P.
LIVERMORE, supra note 11, at 137) with statutory language in text at notes 76 & 77 infra.
76. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(1), 12 U.L.A. 64 (Supp. 1989).
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predominantly in its natural, scenic, historical, agricultural, forested, or
open-space condition."
77
There are two significant aspects of the purposes that a conservation
easement must have under the California and Uniform Acts. The first is
their distinctly public nature. No specific parcel of land benefits from the
easement, nor does any private individual benefit-the beneficiary is the
public. Only recently have entities other than publicly accountable gov-
ernment agencies been allowed to acquire conservation easements and in
many states, conservation easements still can be held only by state agen-
cies. In states adopting the Uniform Act, the interest can be held only by
a government agency or a charitable organization having among its re-
sponsibilities, "retaining or protecting the natural, scenic, or open-space
values of real property.17 The charity does not obtain any benefit to
itself (beyond the benefits enjoyed by the general public) for holding the
easement, but rather, acts as a trustee holding the interest for the benefit
of the public. The drafters of the Uniform Act believed the provision
allowing private charitable groups to own the easements would not de-
crease the public purpose of conservation easements. 79 The California
Act states that "it is in the public policy and in the public interest of this
state to encourage the voluntary conveyance of conservation easements
to qualified nonprofit organizations."80 A public purpose also is required
in order for grants to qualify for the federal income tax deduction.,"
In addition, the public purpose is evidenced by the third-party right
of enforcement provided in many conservation easement statutes. If the
charitable holder fails in its obligation as public trustee to enforce the
restriction, any other organization that could qualify as a holder can seek
enforcement of the restriction.
2
The easement's required purposes are significant because they con-
flict with the traditional policy of encouraging the most profitable land
use. Rarely does preservation of open space result in profit. Usually the
owner of land restricted by a conservation easement does not benefit
from any financial gain beyond the value of income or property tax de-
ductions. If social policy always mandated the most profitable use of
land, few conservation easements would exist. In this sense, the passage
of enabling statutes is evidence of a rejection of policy favoring develop-
ment over nondevelopment, at least with regard to land burdened by
conservation easements.
77. CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.2 (West 1982).
78. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(2), 12 U.L.A. 64 (Supp. 1989).
79. Id., Prefatory Note at 61-62.
80. CAL. CIV. CODE § 815 (West 1982).
81. I.R.C. § 170(h)(3) (West Supp. 1989).
82. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(3), 12 U.L.A. 64 (Supp. 1989).
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(2) Strength of Policy
These statutory provisions reflect significant policy support for con-
servation easements. This support is evident also in other provisions and
in case law. Although easements or covenants for the purpose of conser-
vation were available prior to the statutes, the statutes help secure the
status of conservation easements. As the Uniform Act states, "[O]ne of
the Act's basic goals is to remove outmoded common law defenses that
could impede the use of easements for conservation or preservation
ends."'8 3 The California Act includes a legislative finding that "the pres-
ervation of land in its natural, scenic, agricultural, historical, forested, or
open-space condition is among the most important environmental assets
of California."'8 4 Another California statute, the California Open-Space
Easement Act of 1974, declares that "open-space lands, if preserved and
maintained, would constitute important physical, social, economic or
aesthetic assets to existing or pending urban development.
' 85
The strength of public policy favoring conservation easements is evi-
denced also by provisions for reduced property assessments. 86 Such pro-
visions further encourage the use of conservation easements at the public
expense in the form of lower property taxes. A reduced assessment,
where no party obtains a corresponding property value increase (e.g.,
when an access easement is granted to a neighboring property owner) is,
in effect, a public subsidization of the easement.
When the state does not require reduced property tax assessments
by statute, courts have relied on legislative findings similar to the Califor-
nia provision cited above to require them.87 Even without a statutory
policy statement, a court may rely on public support for conservation
easements to require a reduced assessment. In a recent Massachusetts
case, the state supreme court upheld the denial of an abatement sought
by the owner of land restricted by a conservation easement because the
83. Id. § 4 comment at 68.
84. CAL. CIv. CODE § 815 (West 1982).
85. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51072 (West 1983).
86. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Village of Ridgewood v. Bolger Found., 104 N.J. 337, 341-42, 517 A.2d 135,
137 (1986). Ordering the state to reduce the property tax assessment for conservation ease-
ments; the court cited the preamble statement to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.63 (West 1983):
the legislature hereby finds and declares that natural open space area for public recre-
ation and conservation purposes are rapidly diminishing; that public funds for the
acquisition and maintenance of public open space should be supplemented by private
individuals and conservation organizations; and that it is therefore in the public in-
terest to encourage the dedication of privately-owned open space to public use and
enjoyment as provided for in this act.
Id. See also City of Newark v. Township of Vernon, 1 N.J. Tax 90, (1980) ("The benefits
received by lower taxes may be the best economic incentive to insure private participation in
the conservation of open space.").
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easement did not benefit another parcel of land.8 8 The Massachusetts
Attorney General applied for a rehearing because of the case's impor-
tance "to the cause of environmental conservation" and its precedential
value.89 Sixteen charitable organizations joined in an amicus brief 90 and
the court reversed itself on rehearing.91
The policy favoring the most economically productive use of land
began with the rise of the industrial revolution in the 1800s.92 At a time
when the natural resources of the country appeared boundless, a social
policy favoring conservation of the environment over economic exploita-
tion of land was unthinkable. The benefits of economic growth were too
great and the ecological cost unforeseen. Concern over the ecological
costs of favoring industrial growth arose only recently. 93 Even early con-
servation easements provided merely "an aesthetic luxury good for the
mind and soul but little else."' 94 The general public has only recently
begun to realize the importance of open space to support our environ-
mental systems.95 Today, "[t]he preservation of open space is a neces-
sity, not a luxury."
'96
In one sense, the emphasis on productive land use is not different
from the policy favoring environmental protection. The underlying com-
mitment of both policies is that land be put to its "best" use. Thus, the
issue becomes: What use is best? The answer to this problem should
consider that the best use might not depend solely on profitability. As
some commentators have observed, "[lands should be put to their best
use, and development should be channeled away from those lands whose
best use can only be achieved if they are left open."'9 7 The best use of a
river may not be to dam it up and then distribute the water to irrigate
farmland, but rather, allow it to run unfettered to the sea. The diversion
of its historical path may have tragic consequences on ecosystems vital to
our environment. The best use of forestland may not be timber supply
but rather support, in an undisturbed state, of the ecosystems that de-
pend on it. In short, best use should not always be determined by the
highest market price.
88. Parkinson v. Board of Assessors of Medfield, 395 Mass. 643, 481 N.E.2d 491 (1985),
rev'd, 398 Mass. 112, 495 N.E.2d 294 (1986).
89. Parkinson v. Board of Assessor of Medfield, 398 Mass. 112, 112-13 & n.1, 495 N.E.2d
294, 295 & n.1 (1986).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 344, 495 N.E.2d at 297.
92. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 32-34 (1977)
93. The beginning of broad public awareness of the modern threat to the environment
can be traced to the publication of Rachel Carson's classic book, R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING
(1962).
94. T. BARRETT & P. LIVERMORE, supra note 11, at 1.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2.
97. Id.
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II. Doctrine of Changed Conditions
Despite statutory and judicial support for conservation easements,
there is concern about their ability to withstand a "changed conditions"
challenge. 98 This section examines the nature and purpose of the doc-
trine of changed conditions to analyze whether its application to conser-
vation easements is appropriate. 99
A. History
The doctrine of changed conditions developed at common law long
before the appearance of conservation easements. It developed as an eq-
uitable response to the creation of real covenants and equitable servi-
tudes. Some historical background is useful to understand the scope and
limits of this doctrine.
(1) Development of Servitude Law
Courts created real covenants and equitable servitudes in response
to the inflexible nature of common-law easements (i.e., as exceptions to
easement law). Two theories explain this development and also reflect
the inability of traditional easement law to afford use restrictions the pro-
98. The changed conditions doctrine is also known as the "change of neighborhood" or
"change in circumstances" doctrine. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 679[2] & n.50.
99. The Restatement of Property provides the following under the heading of "changed
circumstances":
Injunctive relief against violation of the obligations arising out of a promise respect-
ing the use of land cannot be secured if conditions have so changed since the making
of the promise as to make it impossible longer to secure in a substantial degree the
benefits intended to be secured by the performance of the promise.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 564 (1944). See generally A. CASNER, supra note 6, § 9.39
("[A] change in character of the surrounding neighborhood, that would render the enforce-
ment of a building restriction oppressive and inequitable, has resulted in a termination of the
covenant, so that the burdened landowner is no longer under any duty to comply with the
restriction.") (citations omitted); 5 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 679[2] ("This so-called 'doc-
trine of changed circumstances' provides an important defense against a covenantee who is
seeking injunctive relief where a restriction can be proved to have outlived its usefulness")
(footnotes omitted).
Although developed in the courts, at least one state has codified the doctrine. New York
authorizes a court in any action seeking relief against a restrictive covenant, or a declaration
with respect to its enforceability, to terminate the restriction
if the court shall find that the restriction is of no actual and substantial benefit to the
persons seeking its enforcement or seeking a declaration or determination of its en-
forceability, either because the purpose of the restriction has already been accom-
plished or, by reason of changed conditions or other cause, its purpose is not capable
of accomplishment, or for any other reason.
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 1951(2) (McKinney 1979). This statute was passed in 1962, 162
N.Y. Laws 142, well before New York's statute allowing the creation of conservation ease-
ments, 1983 N.Y. Laws 1020 (codified as N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 49-0301-0311 (Mc-
Kinney 1984 & Supp. 1989)).
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tection given to easements. The first theory holds that real covenants
evolved from an expansion of warranty and contract law into the arena
of property law during the 1800s. I00 Two landowners, for example,
would enter into a contract respecting the use by one landowner of the
other's land. This contract would then influence the real property rights
held by the owners. A second theory holds that real covenants and equi-
table servitudes originated in the judicial enforcement of "equitable ease-
ments." 10' The granting of a right to enter land might have been deemed
an equitable easement or servitude despite nonconformity with the re-
quirements of an easement deed. Regardless of these theories, it appears
that neither real covenants nor equitable servitudes would have devel-
oped, "[i]f the law had let the list of negative easements expand naturally
with the changes that took place in urban development."
o10 2
Traditional easement law allowed only four negative easements, or
restrictions, on the use of land: those that protected the easement
holder's right to light, air, support for a building, or a flow of water.
Other private land use restrictions could not be enforced under the law of
easements.10 3 Rather, they could be enforced only by covenant or equita-
ble servitude. Because restrictions labeled real covenants or equitable
servitudes did not develop under easement law, they were not accorded
the protection that easements had. Common-law courts viewed cove-
nants and servitudes as mere equitable interests or contract rights, l04 but
considered easements as "property, of which its owner [could not] law-
fully be deprived without his consent."'
0 5
The issue generally presented by such restrictions was whether they
were enforceable against subsequent purchasers of the land. In the fa-
mous case of Tulk v. Moxhay,10 6 the court enforced a negative covenant
on a successor to the covenantor when the purchaser took the land with
knowledge of the covenant. Since Tulk v. Moxhay restrictions on land
100. See, eg., H. SIMS, A TREATISE ON COVENANTS WHICH RUN WITH LAND OTHER
THAN COVENANTS FOR TITLE, 45-49 (1901). This theory is summed up in the statement that
covenants "are derived from warranty, and... are not a species of easements." Id. at 174; see
also J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 66, at 1092 ("There is today no reason why real
covenants, equitable servitudes, and easements should not be merged into a wider concept of
servitudes.").
101. L. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EASEMENTS 97-104 (1898). On the different
theories generally, see H. SIMS, supra note 100, at 48-49 (disagreeing with those (including
Justice Holmes) who argue that covenants developed "from certain improper or spurious ease-
ments"); Stoebuck, Running Covenants: An Analytical Primer, 52 WASH. L. REV. 861, 888
(1977).
102. J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 66, at 962.
103. Id.
104. Sims refers to the interest as a "chose in action." H. SIMS, supra note 100, at 21.
105. L. JONES, supra note 101, at 17.
106. 41 Eng. Rep. 1143, 1145 (Ch. 1848).
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beyond the four negative easements allowed at common law were,
although not as secure as easements, potentially perpetual.
(2) Development of the Doctrine of Changed Conditions
The doctrine of changed conditions began as a defense to an action
in equity seeking to enforce an equitable servitude.10 7 A landowner
could defend his decision to build a gas station on his property, though
contrary to the language of an agreement with a neighbor, by claiming
that the agreement is no longer enforceable because of a change in the
area. The owner of restricted land may use the doctrine either as a de-
fense in a servitude holder's action for an injunction, or as an affirmative
action seeking a declaratory judgment that the restriction is no longer
enforceable. 108
Once a restriction has been held unenforceable, it is unclear whether
a claim for damages remains. Is the covenant actually extinguished or
merely unenforceable in equity? Traditionally, if a court prohibited an
injunction due to changed conditions, damages still were available and
the restriction remained as a cloud on title. 109 Courts subsequently re-
jected this view, allowing termination of the restriction at law as well as
in equity. 10
Covenants and servitudes are often designed to restrict development
in housing subdivisions and the changed conditions doctrine is com-
monly used in such situations.III In Barton v. Moline Properties, 12 the
owner of a Miami Beach lot brought an action to remove restrictions that
prohibited him from erecting any building other than a residence built
according to certain specifications.1 13 The Florida Supreme Court ac-
cepted for purposes of appeal the plaintiff's allegations that "at the time
of the original deed ... the locality of plaintiff's land was suitable for
private residential purposes ... ; [and] that at that time the location of
said land was private, quiet, and partook of the general nature and char-
107. Stoebuck, supra note 101, at 903 (It is unclear whether this equitable doctrine applies
to real covenants. Because of the declining use of covenants and their virtual replacement by
equitable servitudes, however, this question has lost significance.).
108. Annotation, Change of Neighborhood in Restricted District as Affecting Restrictive
Covenant; Decisions Since 1927, 4 A.L.R.2d 1111, 1113 (1949). For changed conditions as a
defense to an injunctive action, see, Sandstrom v. Larsen, 59 Haw. 491, 498, 583 P.2d 971, 977
(1978); for an example of affirmative use of the doctrine, see, Duffy v. Mollo, 121 R.I. 480, 400
A.2d 263 (1979):
109. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 563 comment b (1944); 5 R. POWELL, supra note 5,
§ 679[2].
110. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 679[2] & nn. 66 & 67.
111. For a general discussion of the doctrine of changed conditions, see A. CASNER, supra
note 6, § 9.22; 5 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 679[2].
112. 121 Fla. 683, 164 So. 551 (1935).
113. Id. at 687, 164 So. at 553.
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acteristics of the other restricted lots in said subdivision. 11 4 At the time
of the suit, however, the City of Miami Beach had grown and the areas
adjoining the plaintiff's land had become predominantly commercial.1 15
As an example of the change in the neighborhood, the court cited the
existence of "a casino known as 'Villa Venice,' wherein a cabaret, restau-
rant, and roadhouse is operated, patrons are furnished with food, en-
tertainment, music and dancing, bathrooms and bathing suits, and
bathing privileges for patronage of the public generally, which continues
until the early hours of each morning .... 1 16 The plaintiff alleged that
because of these changes in the character of the surrounding area, his
land "ha[d] no value as a residential property, but ha[d] a great value and
[was] readily usable and marketable as business and commercial prop-
erty." 117 In upholding the lower court's ruling, the Florida Supreme
Court stated that:
where the [duration of] a restrictive covenant ... has not been ex-
pressly limited by the parties, it should be implied that some reason-
able limitation adapted to the nature of the case was intended, and that
such restrictions as the stated covenants imposed on the use of any
particular grantee's property, being in derogation of the otherwise free
use and enjoyment of same, should be construed as extending for no
longer period of time than the nature of circumstances and purpose of
their imposition would indicate as reasonable for the duration of their
enforcement without undue and inequitable prejudice to the property
rights purchased and acquired by the original grantee and his succes-
sors in title, subject to such restrictive covenants.' 18
Barton contains both of the primary rationales for-applying the doc-
trine. First, is an implied intention by the parties to terminate the restric-
tion upon the occurrence of the originally unforeseen events. Second,
and often, as in Barton, not expressly stated, is a preference for the most
profitable or productive use of land over the language of the agreement.
These rationales are discussed in the next section.
B. Purpose and Policy of the Doctrine
The most frequent basis courts use to apply the doctrine of changed
conditions is an implied intent by the original parties to terminate the
restriction in the event that the changed conditions or the hardship oc-
curred. As one commentator has observed:
The [changed conditions] cases proceed upon the theory that in all
building restrictions there is an implied intention upon the part of the
original parties that the restrictive covenants are only to last during the
time that the basic purpose of the subdivision can be carried out; and
114. Id. at 687-88, 164 So. at 553.
115. Id. at 686, 164 So. at 553-54.
116. Id. at 689, 164 So. at 554.
117. Id. at 690, 164 So. at 554.
118. Id. at 694, 164 So. at 556.
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that when the change in the surrounding neighborhood has rendered it
impossible to continue to carry out this basic purpose of creating and
maintaining a restricted residential area, the parties contemplated that
the covenants would come to their natural end. 19
In Barton v. Moline Properties, the court stated the test for applying
the doctrine as "whether or not the original purpose and intention of the
parties to such restrictive covenants can be reasonably carried out, in the
light of alleged materially changed conditions."'' 20  While the courts
place great emphasis on the parties' intent, at least one author believes
that implying an intent to terminate the restriction on the changed cir-
cumstances is a fictitious justification for nullifying the restriction.' 2'
Clearly stating the purpose of a conservation easement in the deed
and the easement's increasing importance despite a change in the sur-
rounding area probably would prevent a court from implying an intent to
terminate. Even with clear drafting, however, as Professor Dunham
(writing before the passage of modern conservation easement statutes)
noted, "the risk is always present, and the desirability of more effectively
utilizing land might weigh more heavily with the court than the desira-
bility of effectuating the intention of the parties."'
122
The second rationale for allowing parties to terminate covenants and
equitable servitudes is the concern for marketability and efficient use of
land. The rationale for New York's change of conditions statute is "the
public interest in the marketability and full utilization of land."'123
Courts generally interpret restrictive covenants "strictly against persons
seeking to enforce them and in favor of the unencumbered use of the
property."' 2 4 In Blakely v. Gorin,125 an injunction to prevent a violation
of a building restriction was denied, though the purpose was not obsolete,
because "continuation of the restriction... would impede reasonable use
of the land for purposes for which it is most suitable, and would tend to
impair the growth of the neighborhood or municipality in a manner in-
119. A. CASNER, supra note 6, § 9.22. See also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 564
(1944), quoted in note 99 supra.
120. 121 Fla. 683, 695, 164 So. 551, 556 (1935); see also AC Assoc. v. First Nat'l Bank of
Fla., 453 So. 2d 1121, 1127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
The test is whether or not the covenant is valid on the basis that the original inten-
tion of the parties can be carried out despite alleged materially changed conditions
or, on the other hand, whether the covenant is invalid because changed conditions
have frustrated the object of the covenant without fault or neglect on the part of the
party who seeks to be relieved from the restrictions.
121. Reichman, supra note 68, at 1259.
122. A. DUNHAM, supra note 1, at 18.
123. N.Y. Legis. Doc. 1958, No. 65, at 254, cited in Orange & Rockland Util. v. Philwold
Estates, 52 N.Y. 253, 265, 418 N.E.2d 1310, 1315, 437 N.Y.S.2d 291, 296 (1981).
124. Welsch v. Goswick, 130 Cal. App. 3d 398, 406, 181 Cal. Rptr. 703, 708 (1982) (cita-
tion omitted).
125. 365 Mass. 590, 313 N.E.2d 903 (1974).
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consistent with the public interest."126 Underlying this statement is the
belief that utilization and economic development furthers the public in-
terest more than the restriction. The court apparently considered eco-
nomic development more important than the policy of enforcing the
intent of the parties.
As one commentator has described this policy framework: "Appli-
cation of the [changed conditions] rule strikes a balance between the
pressure for redevelopment and the desire for stability. The changed
conditions doctrine thus assures that the permanency of servitudes does
not prevent economic productivity of land."127 The policy of full utiliza-
tion, however, can be overcome by policies supporting conservation and
open space. Thus, if states begin to value the co-existence of economic
development and conservation of natural and scenic resources, a fee
owner's desire to develop might not be grounds for overriding the public
interest in the availability of open space. Although land restricted by a
conservation easement will always be less marketable, the advent of con-
servation easement statutes could represent a partial rejection of policies
favoring the "full utilization" of land.
C. Factors to Determine Changed Conditions
Courts consider several factors in determining whether a restriction
is unenforceable because of changed conditions. These factors include
the intent of the parties, the foreseeability of the change in conditions, the
loss of potential profits, economic burden on the land owner, the location
of the changes, the benefit to the servitude holder, and the duration of the
restriction.
In accord with the implied intent of the parties rationale, one of the
primary factors is the actual intent of the parties. In AC Associates v.
First National Bank of Florida,128 the court stated the test for cancelling
a restrictive covenant as:
[w]hether or not the covenant is valid on the basis that the original
intention of the parties can be carried out despite alleged materially
changed conditions ....
[T]he issue ... is not what the parties would do today, but rather
whether the ... restrictions remain substantially capable of serving
purposes intended when the restrictions were imposed.12
9
126. Id. at 605, 313 N.E.2d at 912 (citing MAss. GEN. L. ch. 184, § 30 (West Supp.
1989)).
127. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1300 (1982). See generally Korngold, supra note 2, at 447-67 (discussing
the conflicting policies of "freedom and enforceability of contract versus free alienability and
unrestricted use of land").
128. 453 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1984).
129. Id. at 1127.
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Intent will be strictly construed against the party seeking to enforce
the restriction, and therefore must be clear and provide for any foresee-
able later circumstance. 130 In Racine v. United States 131 the court inter-
preted a scenic easement grant which provided that, "only one residence
and one tenant dwelling are authorized within the easement area," so as
to allow the building of barns and corrals for a dude ranch. 132 The court
relied on the "plain language of the easement." The court stated:
It would have been easy for the Government's drafter to place lan-
guage in the deed prohibiting all dude ranching buildings otherwise
permitted by the regulations .... But the Government did not do so.
Because of this drafting failure, the Government is now essentially ask-
ing us to re-write the deed.133
The foreseeability of the changed circumstances at the time the re-
striction was imposed might be used by courts to imply an intention to
terminate the restriction. In A C Associates, the court refused to termi-
nate the restriction, stating that, "[t]here ha[d] been no showing that
commercial development of the [property] was not foreseeable and, in
fact, foreseen at the time of the... agreement."' 134 On the other hand, if
the purpose of the restriction is clearly stated and the purpose is no
longer served by enforcing the restriction, no such implication is neces-
sary and a court will not issue an injunction.
Parties seeking to have a restriction declared unenforceable often
cite the low value of the burdened land and the loss of potential profits.
These factors alone, however, are not enough to terminate the restriction.
In AC Associates, the plaintiffs sought to remove a restriction on their
land that allowed for parking spaces for a neighbor's store. The plaintiffs
claimed changed conditions and hardship. The court felt that the real
reason for the suit was to build a new office, retail, and hotel develop-
ment and stated that, "the law does not permit cancellation of property
restrictions for the purpose of accommodating the best or most profitable
use of a particular piece of property affected by the restriction." 35 The
fact that burdened land would be more profitable if the restriction were
130. One author has cited this fact as a disadvantage of conservation easements as a land
use device, stating,
[a conservation] easement's flexibility, while an advantage for negotiators, makes
lawyers lose sleep. They have to draft a document that will unflinchingly protect the
land forever but will also adapt to new owners, new ownership patterns, changes in
the physical environment, urban growth and decay, new land use regulations, and
every other unforeseen change. The cases in which this miracle is achieved are prob-
ably far fewer than we usually admit.
Roush, supra note 5, at 71.
131. 858 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1988).
132. Id. at 508.
133. Id. at 509.
134. 453 So. 2d 1121, 1127 (Fla. App. 1984).
135. Id. at 1125.
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removed is thus an insufficient reason to terminate the restriction. In-
creased value may, however, "carry weight when other factors are also
present." 13
6
Another factor is whether the changed conditions have occurred
within the boundaries of the burdened land. A court is more likely to
uphold a restriction when the changes are to the area surrounding the
restricted land. 137 The rationale is essentially one of acquiescence on the
part of the holder. If beneficiaries of a restriction do not object to a
change in a housing subdivision and later another change is proposed, a
court could assume that because the earlier change was unopposed, the
beneficiaries "did not care very much if the servitude was relaxed."
138
Because the beneficiaries of a restriction never have such a claim when
the changes occur outside the restricted area, the courts have been less
willing to apply the doctrine in that situation.139
Courts also consider the relative burden on the servient land owner
and the benefit to the restriction's beneficiary. The weight a court gives
to one side or the other varies widely among jurisdictions. Some courts
hold that if any substantial value remains to the holder of a restriction, it
should be upheld regardless of changed conditions. 140 The Restatement
section on relative hardship 14 1 seer.s to take the opposite position, al-
lowing a defense against an injunction merely when "the harm done by
136. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 679[2]; Stoebuck, supra note 101, at 883-884 ("judicial
opinions sometimes state that changes in zoning and loss of value to the benefitted land do not
establish a sufficient change of neighborhood, though they may be evidence of it.").
137. Rose, supra note 69, at 1410-11.
138. Id. at 1410 & n.30 (citing cases).
139. Id. at 1411.
140. E.g., AC Assoc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Fla., 453 So. 2d 1121, 1127 (Fla. Sup. Ct.
1984).
141. The doctrine of changed conditions is often distinguished from a related theory, the
doctrine of relative hardship. As with changed conditions, this doctrine may be used either as
a defensive tool by a landowner against an action to enforce a restriction, or by the beneficiary
of a servitude in a declaratory relief action. The Restatement provides a separate rule for this
theory: "[i]njunctive relief against violation of the obligation arising out of a promise respect-
ing the use of land will be denied if the harm done by granting the injunction will be dispropor-
tionate to the benefits secured thereby." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 563 (1944). Courts
generally have required that the harm be greatly disproportionate to the benefit.
Because a landowner usually relies on the changed conditions doctrine because of some
hardship, e.g., Barton v. Moline Properties, 121 Fla. 683, 690, 164 So. 551, 554 (1935) (the
development "made it impossible and impracticable to use plaintiff's land for residential pur-'
poses," the only purposes allowed by the restriction) and the hardship often is caused by a
change in conditions, the two doctrines often overlap. See, e.g., A. CASNER, supra note 6,
§ 9.39; 5 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 679[4] & n.79. Justice Kennedy, before his appointment
to the Supreme Court stated: "[t]he doctrine of changed conditions operates to prevent the
perpetuation of inequitable and oppressive restrictions on land use and development that
would merely harass or injure one party without benefitting the other." Cortese v. United
States, 782 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kennedy, J.). One author points out that "the changed
conditions doctrine is simply a reformulation of the relative hardship doctrine." French, supra
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granting the injunction will be disproportionate to the benefits." 142
Scholars have criticized this view, 143 however, and courts generally have
required a gross disproportion between the benefit and the harm.144 In
examining the burden on the landowner, one must remember that the
traditional restrictive covenant or servitude is intended to benefit both
the holder of the servitude and the owner of the restricted land. 145 The
owner has an expectation that the restriction will continue to benefit her.
If the owner has no such expectation, it is questionable whether this is a
relevant factor.
Courts also consider the duration of the restriction as a factor in
applying the doctrine of changed conditions. 14 6 Generally, the longer the
duration, the more likely that the restriction will be terminated. This
rule follows from the desire to limit the control of the "dead hand."' 147
The longer the duration of a restriction, the longer decisions made by
people no longer living will control the use of property. The longer a
restriction's duration, the less likely it is to comport with the property's
best use.
note 127, at 1280 n.105 (citing C. DONAHUE, T. KAUPER, & P. MARTIN, PROPERTY 1033
(1974)).
As a practical matter, a factual situation involving one of these doctrines will usually
involve the other. The distinction is essentially one of underlying rationales: the changed
conditions doctrine relies largely on an implied intent of the parties, while the relative hardship
doctrine balances the burden on the fee owner and the benefit to the holder of the restriction.
A court will be unlikely, however, to grant much weight to one argument unless there is evi-
dence of the other. See A. CASNER, supra note 6, § 9.39 n.6. The label "changed conditions"
will be used throughout this Note to indicate both equitable doctrines.
142. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 563 (1944).
143. See, e.g., C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN
WITH LAND" 184-86 (1947).
144. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 679[3] & n.73.
145. Stoebuck, supra note 101, at 886.
146. Note, Equity: Removal of Restrictive Covenants in California-What Constitutes
Changed Conditions, 7 HASTINGS L.J. 209, 212 (1956) (authored by Donald C. Thuesen).
147. The policy against allowing decisions made by people no longer living to control land
use is most commonly associated with the rule against perpetuities. See, e.g., L. SIMES AND A.
SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1117, at 13 (2d ed. 1956) ("other things being
equal, society is better off, if property is controlled by its living members than if controlled by
the dead. Thus, one policy back of the rule against perpetuities is to prevent too much dead
hand control of property."). The same policy has been used to terminate real covenants. See,
e.g., In re Turners Crossroad Development Co., 277 N.W.2d 364, 369-71, 371 n.5 (Minn. Sup.
Ct. 1979) (invalidating covenant not to compete because it was "inconsistent with the general
policy against restraints on free alienation of property." Id. at 369); Copelan v. Acree Oil Co.,
249 Ga. 276, 278, 290 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1982) (terminating covenant requiring operation of gas
station on property because of "the sound policy that land use must be governed by its present
owners, and should be subjected only in severely restricted circumstances to control by former
owners").
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D. Applicability of Changed Conditions to Easements .
The changed conditions doctrine traditionally is applied only in
cases involving real covenants and equitable servitudes. Easements, on
the other hand, are viewed as distinct property rights, rather than
promises concerning land, and traditionally are resistant to this equitable
doctrine. 48 As one commentator noted: "Courts have viewed ease-
ments as valuable and protected property rights, while treating real cove-
nants with suspicion and subjecting them to greater barriers against
enforcement."
149
Although technically the doctrine of changed circumstances is not
applicable to easements, commentators have used a similar rationale to
justify the termination of easements, 150 arguing that if an easement was
created for a specific purpose and the purpose is accomplished or frus-
trated, the easement should be extinguished.151 Courts also have used
this rationale. In Hahn v. Baker Lodge, No. 47,152 for example, the de-
fendant owned a room in a two-story building and an easement through
the building for ingress and egress. When the building was destroyed by
fire, ingress and egress became impossible and the easement was
extinguished. 5
3
148. See, e.g., Cortese v. United States, 782 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that the
issue of applicability of changed conditions doctrine depended on whether restrictions were
covenants or easements, "[t]he effect of the stipulation was to create covenants, not easements;
and covenants are subject to the doctrine of changed conditions."); AC Associates v. First
Nat'l Bank of Fla., 453 So. 2d 1121, 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Waldrop v. Town of
Brevard, 233 N.C. 26, 31, 62 S.E.2d 512, 515 (1950); First Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank v. Raphael,
201 Va. 718, 723, 113 S.E. 2d 683, 687 (1960); A. DUNHAM, supra note 1, at 20 (writing before
the passage of modem conservation easement statutes, Dunham says that regarding the use of
common law easements for preservation of open space: "the 'changed circumstances' doctrine
has not been applied to easements, so the duration of such interests is not at the mercy of the
courts.") (footnote omitted); French, supra note 127, at 1301; Reichman, supra note 68, at
1180.
149. Korngold, supra note 2, at 436 (citing RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450(b) & com-
ment h (1944)). See also Waldrop v. Town of Brevard, 233 N.C. 26, 31, 62 S.E.2d. 512, 515
(1950); Berger, Some Reflections on a Unified Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1323,
1330 (1982) (stating that, "courts traditionally accord greater deference to easement rights
than to rights which derive from covenants and servitudes.") (footnote omitted); Brewder,
Running Covenants and Public Policy, 77 MIcH. L. REV. 12, 35 (1978) (the author notes that
regular options, while subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities, have "escaped the charge that
they might unlawfully restrain alienation ... [i]n contrast ... most courts have not only
subjected preemptive options to the Rule Against Perpetuities, but have declared that they
may also constitute unreasonable restraints on alienation regardless of their duration.") (foot-
note omitted).
150. Cunningham, Scenic Easements in the Highway Beautification Program, 45 DEN. L.
J. 168, 263; Dunham, supra note 1, at 20 n.78; Korngold, supra note 2, at 483; Reichman,
supra note 68, at 1258-59.
151. L. JONES, supra note 101, § 842-3; R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 422.
152. 21 Or. 30, 31, 27 P. 166, 166 (1891).
153. Id. at 34, 27 P. at 167.
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Unlike the changed conditions doctrine, however, the express pur-
pose of the parties, not implied intent or balancing of hardships, controls
the court's determination. An easement to take water from a particular
well might specify that it will terminate if the well runs dry. Analogizing
to conservation easements, commentators have stated that "[p]rotecting
the habitat of an endangered species makes no sense if, despite such ef-
forts, the species becomes extinct." 154 A real covenant or equitable servi-
tude, by contrast, can terminate despite the continued viability of its
stated intent if a court finds a contrary implied intent or a hardship on
one landowner that outweighs the benefit of the restriction.
Some courts, however, apply the less stringent requirements of the
changed conditions doctrine to easements, 55 while others ignore whether
the interest in question is an easement or lesser interest, terminating it on
changed conditions or hardship grounds.156 While a modern court may
be more likely to terminate easements upon a change in conditions, as a
general matter the barriers to terminate an easement on such grounds are
much greater than those to terminate a covenant.
1. Effect of Reformation of Servitude Law
Conservation easements usually are intended to last forever. It is
therefore necessary to address the possibility of changes in servitude law
that may affect termination of conservation easements. If a conservation
easement is more difficult to terminate because it is an easement and not
a covenant or equitable servitude, then a change in the nature of these
legal distinctions could make conservation easements either less or more
resilient to a changed conditions challenge.
The distinctions between easements, covenants, and equitable servi-
tudes have, with the development of contract law and recording laws,
apparently outlived their usefulness. The law in this area has been called
"the most complex and archaic body of American property law remain-
ing in the twentieth century."'' 57 Increasingly, commentators are calling
for an overhaul of this area of property law. 158 As one author has noted:
questions concerning easements.., will continue to challenge the inge-
nuity of the judiciary, as an attempt is made to achieve sensible land
154. T. BARRETT & P. LIVERMORE, supra note 11, at 33. See infra text accompanying
notes 166-68.
155. See, e.g., AC Assoc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Fla., 453 So. 2d 1121, 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) ("We need not deal in any detail with legal niceties which may surround distinc-
tions between easement and restrictive covenants.").
156. See, e.g., Jackson v. Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496, 501-02, 31 N.E. 691, 693 (1892) (ter-
minating a building restriction in deed without analysis of the nature of the restriction).
157. French, supra note 127, at 1261.
158. See generally Symposium, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. passim (1982). See also J.
DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 66, at 1092; French, supra note 127, at 1262 n.3 (listing
literature criticizing servitude law).
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use within the confines of not overly flexible rules of traditional prop-
erty law.... [I]t may be anticipated that the next decade will witness
long overdue progress in the field of easements, perhaps by way of fed-
eral, state and local legislation.159
Although this "long overdue progress" has not occurred, reform in
this area is likely. Some form of unification of the three types of servi-
tudes likely would emerge from this reform. Scholars disagree widely,
however, on the question of what effect reform will have on the doctrine
of changed conditions. Some suggest that the doctrine would be ex-
panded from its traditional place in covenant and equitable servitude law
to a prominent role in the termination of the unified servitude. 160 Under
this view, the primary inquiry would be "whether the arrangement has.
outlived it usefulness."' 16' When the restriction is still useful, the doc-
trine would not apply. One author argues that "[s]ervitudes... should
be geared to the expected life of the development they serve," to be deter-
mined by the parties themselves or legislatures that "can state at least a
presumptive life span of servitudes for different development pur-
poses." 62 Thus the conservation easement, because the expected life of
the "development" it serves is the life of a habitat or ecosystem, would be
an exception to the rule that "no servitude should be expected to last in
perpetuity."1 63 Another commentator has suggested that unified servi-
tudes should be treated like other possessory interests. Under this view,
termination would be allowed only by eminent domain."
64
Thus, although the result of any reform of servitude law is uncer-
tain, the reasons supplied by scholars for determining whether to apply
the doctrine of changed conditions to a future unified servitude appear to
support the view that a conservation easement should withstand a
changed conditions challenge.
III. Application of the Doctrine of Changed Conditions to
Conservation Easements
There is no such thing as a typical conservation easement. There are
several widely varying types of restrictions included under the title "con-
159. Netherton, Environmental Conservation and Historic Preservation Through Recorded
Land-Use Agreements, 14 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 540, 549-50 (1979) (quoting 3 R. Pow-
ELL, supra note 5, § 404[2]).
160. See French, supra note 127, at 1316-17; Reichman, supra note 68, at 1258-59.
161. French, supra note 127, at 1317.
162. Rose, supra, note 69, at 1414.
163. Id. at 1413-14 & n.43.
164. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
1353, 1367-68 (1982). The author proposes giving the new unified servitude even more protec-
tion than common law easements. "Possessory interests, like the fee simple absolute, are not
defeasible because of changed conditions. Servitudes of infinite duration should be recognized
as well." Id. at 1364.
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servation easement," and even within categories an easement always is
tailored individually to meet the needs and concerns of the grantor and
grantee. 6 5 Because the open space easement is most likely to come
under a changed conditions challenge, the following analysis will ex-
amine this type of interest. Two hypothetical situations concerning con-
servation easements especially warrant analysis. The first involves a
limited purpose conservation easement and the second concerns a general
purpose conservation easement.
A. Limited Purpose Conservation Easements and the Effect of Frustration
of Purpose
In the limited purpose context, suppose a conservation easement is
granted for a specific purpose and the purpose becomes impossible to
fulfill.166 If the easement's purpose is to provide a habitat for an endan-
gered species and the species becomes extinct, the purpose can no longer
be satisfied. Similarly, if land is restricted to provide a migratory way-
station for a species of bird, the purpose cannot be fulfilled if the birds
alter their migratory path and no longer use the land. Clearly, continua-
tion of the easement in such situations would be fruitless. 67 This deter-
mination, however, does not require the use of the traditional changed
conditions rule. Rather, it falls within the more stringent requirements
of the rule for terminating easements when their express purpose can no
longer be fulfilled.1
6 8
When courts declare easements invalid because their purpose has
become frustrated, the landowner generally may use the land as he
desires. This traditional result should not apply, however, if the ease-
ment was created for conservation purposes, since this type of restriction
has a distinctly public nature. In this situation, courts should apply the
cy pres doctrine and reform the grant of the easement in accordance with
the intent of the original parties.
165. New York City's Greenacre Park, for example, is protected by a scenic easement that
"prohibits any construction that would exceed the height of the current [four story building]
and prohibits the use of the site's development rights to support construction on any other site
that would shadow the park or block its view." J. DIEHL & T. BARRETT, supra note 33, at
112.
166. This situation can be avoided by including in the easement deed a provision allowing
the grant to be amended. The parties must be careful in drafting the deed if they are seeking to
qualify for tax deductions based on a grant in perpetuity. Id. at 205-06.
167. T. BARRETT & P. LIVERMORE, supra note 11, at 33.
168. Still, some statutes require or permit that the easement be perpetual, see supra note
63. If these were interpreted to disallow termination under any circumstances, the beneficiary
would still retain the easement and the parcel would remain restricted. Under such circum-
stances, if the retention of the easement were of no value to the holder (i.e., the public for
which it is the trustee), the holder could then grant it back to the owner and the restriction
would be terminated by the holder's release. 3 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 430.7[5][a].
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The cy pres doctrine allows a court to "substitute another plan of
administration which is believed to approach the original scheme as
closely as possible" 169 when the grantor's original specific charitable in-
tent becomes impossible to fulfill. It is designed to ensure that charitable
trust assets are used for the purpose set forth in the trust.170 Accord-
ingly, when a conservation easement can no longer serve its intended
purpose, a court should apply the doctrine and reform the grant to sup-
port the general goal of conservation.
Courts also could permit the owner of the previously burdened land
to buy back the easement. The availability of this option might depend
on the success of applying the cypres doctrine; that is, payment would be
permitted only if the cy pres doctrine could not be used. A payment to
the easement holder reflecting the increased value of the owner's land
would be fair to the landowner and would allow the holder to purchase
another easement for the public benefit.
Skillful drafting of a conservation easement deed should include
provisions that account for foreseeable circumstances. When the unfore-
seeable happens and continuation of an easement restriction would not
serve the underlying purpose, the grant should be reformed to conform
as closely as possible to the original intent of the parties. If reformation
is not possible the fee owner should pay the easement holder for the value
of the easement.
B. General Purpose Conservation Easements and the Effect
of Changed Conditions
In the case of a general purpose conservation easement, land is re-
stricted for the purpose of retaining the current natural state of the fee
owner's land. The owner of such land in many cases may desire to have
the easement judicially terminated in order to develop the property. The
following illustration may be useful. 0 owns rural ranchland and
although there has been some development in the area, 0 has no inten-
tion of leaving the ranching business. He discovers that by donating a
conservation easement, he can receive a charitable deduction from his
income taxes and a reduction in his rising property tax assessment. At
this time, the restriction's effect on the property value is insignificant.
Consequently, 0 donates an easement with the stated purpose of retain-
ing the land forever for agricultural or open-space purposes.
Time passes and the area surrounding O's land experiences increas-
ing growth. Although the property value of his restricted land has re-
mained about the same, the value of his land without the restriction has
skyrocketed. The property now abuts a four-lane highway and both sides
169. G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 431 (1935), cited in E. FISCH,
THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES § 100, at 1- (1950).
170. 4 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 587.
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of the street beyond the border of his property are lined with gas stations,
office buildings, and shops. 0 decides to leave the ranching business and
sells the land to P.
Twenty or thirty years pass and residents are concerned about hous-
ing shortages and the high costs of available space. Because of increased
costs, operating a ranch in the area is now unprofitable. 17  P receives
many inquiries about developing her land or selling it for development,
but prospective developers and purchasers lose interest when they dis-
cover the restriction on the property. One prospective buyer offers P
$10,000,000 for the property, provided she can remove the restriction.
With the restriction, the fair market value of the land is $500,000. P now
has a strong financial incentive to attempt to have the restriction declared
unenforceable under the changed conditions doctrine. This hypothetical
leads to a discussion of both the policy and traditional factors underlying
the changed conditions doctrine and their relation to conservation
easements.
(1) Conservation Easements and the Policy Basis for Changed Conditions
Because of the common law nature of the changed conditions doc-
trine, there would appear to be little benefit in applying the doctrine
when its underlying rationales would not be served. The next section
argues that the policy basis for applying the doctrine is not served when
the doctrine is used to terminate a conservation easement.
a. Policy Favoring the Intent of the Parties
The most common rationale for application of the changed condi-
tions doctrine is that if the parties had foreseen the changes that oc-
curred, they would have provided for the restriction's termination in the
original covenant or grant.172 In the example above, however, the intent
of the parties was to preserve the condition of the land when surrounding
conditions changed. Thus, the parties anticipated development in the
area and, presumably, the forsaken value of the land as time passed. As
one commentator has noted, conservation easements "assume that open-
space land is valuable simply because it is undeveloped, especially if it
contests with surrounding land. Thus, if the neighboring area becomes
developed (a 'changed condition'), the conservation [easement's] purpose
is even better served than before."' 173 Consequently, it is illogical to im-
ply an intent to terminate the easement upon development of the sur-
171. An even more extreme example can be drawn when the town zones the property for
commercial use only, making agricultural use not only unprofitable, but actually impossible.
Such an example would present a substantial question of a "taking" of both the land and of the
easement itself.
172. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
173. Korngold, supra note 2,'at 480.
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rounding area because parties intend that easements persist in precisely,
such changed conditions. Moreover, "[lt would be ironic if the restric-
tions could be defeated because the very external changes that were pre-
dicted, did in fact occur."'
174
One court used this rationale in a case involving light and air restric-
tions. In Blakely v. Gorin,175 the court distinguished the case before it
from the usual case of changed conditions involving housing subdivi-
sions, finding that changed conditions had increased the value of the
restrictions:
While restrictions requiring setbacks or prohibiting mercantile uses
clearly have reference to maintaining the overall character of a neigh-
borhood and can thus become obsolete as that neighborhood changes,
•.. this restriction is intended to secure a specific benefit to each resi-
dence it affects. So long as any of those residences continues to exist, it
cannot be called obsolete. As this urban area has grown and become
ever more congested in the century since this restriction was first im-
posed, light and air have become more, not less, valuable. The restric-
tion securing the respondents' rights to them is certainly not
obsolete. 176
The restriction in Blakely, although similar to conservation ease-
ments in many ways, was not technically a conservation easement
granted under an enabling statute. Yet, even without the statutory pro-
tection provided conservation easements, the court did not apply the
changed conditions rule. The added protection given to conservation
easements by enabling statutes and the accompanying public policy sup-
port should provide an even greater barrier against the doctrine's appli-
cation to conservation easements.
b. Policy Favoring the Most Efficient Use of Land
There are two possible views of policy favoring the most efficient use
of land restricted by conservation easements. Neither view supports the
termination of conservation easements. The first states. that policy favor-
ing the preservation of natural and open spaces conflicts with traditional
policy favoring the efficient use of land as measured in terms of economic
productivity. Under this view, recent public policy supporting conserva-
tion easements is a partial rejection of the traditional policy favoring de-
velopment.1 77 Thus, policy supporting termination of restrictions in
order to promote the most efficient use of land must be balanced against
the traditional weight given the intent of the parties and the strong public
policy favoring conservation.
174. 3 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 430.7[6].
175. 365 Mass. 590, 313 N.E.2d 903 (1974).
176. Id. at 365 Mass. at 604, 313 N.E.2d at 912 (emphasis added).
177. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
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A second view of the policy endorsing efficient use of land holds that
conservation is, in itself, an efficient use. Open space, under this view, is
not unproductive land. Rather, it is both useful and necessary to pre-
serve our environment and the natural beauty of open space. 178 When
open space is not viewed as wasted land, but as a productive and efficient
use of land, application of the changed conditions doctrine to terminate a
natural state easement subverts the policy.
(2) Conservation Easements and Traditional Factors for Applying the Changed
Conditions Doctrine
Notwithstanding the lack of a policy basis for application of the doc-
trine to conservation easements, a court may examine the easement ac-
cording to the traditional factors in a changed conditions doctrine
analysis. The consideration traditionally given to the intent of the origi-
nal parties does not support the application of the doctrine. The purpose
of a conservation easement is increasingly relevant and important pre-
cisely as the surrounding conditions change. The intent usually is made
clear in the documents of the grant 179 and it would be difficult for a court
to imply another purpose. Also, the intent is indicated not only in the
grant, but in enabling statutes. In order for the easement to receive pro-
tection provided by the Uniform Act, its purposes must "include retain-
ing or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property,
assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-
space use."' 180
Consideration given to relative harm to the owner and benefit to the
public likewise does not support the doctrine's application. In the hypo-
thetical example, once the ranching business is no longer economically
viable, P loses not only the potential profit from selling her land for its
market value without the restrictive easement, but also the ability to use
her land for any other profitable purpose. P purchased the land with
knowledge of the restriction, however, and the ability to foresee changes
in the area. In contrast with the typical covenant or equitable servitude,
the conservation easement is not designed to benefit the owner of the
restricted parcel (except insofar as the owner is also a member of the
general public). Thus, P cannot now claim damage because the restric-
tion was never intended to benefit her individually.
In addition, the price of the land when P bought it presumably was
discounted by the probability of eventual change in the area. To allow a
court to lift the restriction upon such conditions would amount to a
windfall to P at the expense of the public. Furthermore, many courts do
178. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., T. BARRETT & P. LIVERMORE, supra note 11, at 136-37 (statements of
intent in sample conservation easement document).
180. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § l(1), 12 U.L.A. 64 (Supp. 1989).
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not consider the harm to the owner if there is any benefit remaining to
the holder of the easement. As one observer has noted, "[tjhe ultimate
test of a change sufficient to invoke the doctrine is most often stated to be
such a change as has caused the restriction to be outmoded and to have
lost its usefulness, so that its benefits have already been substantially
lost." 81 Changes in the area surrounding the burdened land, however,
are unlikely to lead to this result. As another writer has stated, "as de-
velopment pressures increase, the public receives a correspondingly
greater benefit from the preservation of open space land." 182 Thus, the
greater the development, or change, the greater the benefit to the general
public.
The duration of the restriction is another factor courts consider. As
with the statutory rejection of any policy favoring unbalanced develop-
ment of land over conservation of natural resources, however, the statu-
tory provisions for perpetual duration should override the policy against
control of the "dead hand"' 83 in the case of conservation easements.
In addition, the location of the changes also is relevant.1 84 Courts
are less likely to enforce a restriction when the changes occur outside the
restricted area. In the hypothetical, development has occurred outside
the restricted area. The example does not avoid this issue, however, be-
cause the purpose of a conservation easement, to preserve the existing use
of the land, would make any change inside the restricted area a violation
of the easement. When the owner does develop the land in some way and
the holder of the easement does not discover it, it is conceivable that a
court would not enforce the easement.185 This situation is more like a
case of acquiescence or abandonment than one of changed conditions.
Even in such a case, damages for violation of the easement would be
appropriate.
Because application of the doctrine of changed conditions to conser-
vation easements would neither further the policies behind the doctrine
nor be justified when the traditional factors for its application are ex-
181. Stoebuck, supra note 101, at 883.
182. Note, Conservation Easements in Oregon: Abuses & Solutions, 14 ENVTL. L. 555, 555
(1985) (authored by John Casey Miles) (footnote omitted).
183. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
185. One writer argues that conservation organizations inability to monitor conservation
easements is a significant shortcoming of the device.
Ineffective monitoring of existing [conservation] easements could prove to be the
Achilles heel that nullifies all the effort to date .... Supposedly, conservation ease-
ments run in perpetuity. Failure to monitor and enforce an easement could cause a
court to rule it legally abandoned. Conservation easement programs must devote
more attention to assuring as well as possible that effective monitoring will be main-
tained as years and generations go by.
Emory, Conservation Easements: Two Problems Needing Attention, in PRIVATE OPTIONS:
TOOLS AND CONCEPTS FOR LAND CONSERVATION, supra note 1, at 196-97.
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amined, the doctrine should not be used to terminate conservation
easements.
Conclusion
Although a conservation easement is in many ways unlike a tradi-
tional common law easement, this should not preclude enabling statutes
from giving it easement status. As an easement, it is either immune from
the equitable doctrine of changed conditions or afforded much greater
protection than that afforded traditional real covenants and equitable
servitudes.
When a court does not preclude a changed conditions challenge to a
conservation easement as a matter of law, an analysis of both the policy
rationale for the doctrine and the factors favoring its applicability illus-
trates that the doctrine should not apply to a conservation easement un-
less the easement's purpose has become obsolete. In that case, the public
nature of the easement requires either that the owner pay the holder the
value of the easement or that the court reform the easement grant ac-
cording to the cy pres doctrine.
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